They succeed in making further headway on the road to a satisfactory solution of the predator problem. But there is also a distinct difference: whereas Nussbaum attaches considerable importance to species membership, Donaldson and Kymlicka focus on community membership, thus taking account of the sociopolitical context of animal justice. There are important similarities between this theory and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. I finally turn to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights. However, the considerable conceptual gains that Nussbaum is able to achieve through the introduction of the species-specific norm of flourishing in the discussion of the predation problem are at least partly being undone by the way she compiles a catalogue of innate or ‘basic’ capabilities relevant to animal species (Sect. To explore this avenue, I then turn to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach that centers on the idea that a creature’s well-being is dependent on its opportunities to realize some basic natural abilities or competences. This recourse to the notion of ‘competence’ could open an avenue for a more balanced view of the predator-prey relationship, in which predator and prey are no longer seen respectively as invincible and defenseless (Sect. According to Regan we have no duty to interfere with wildlife to prevent predation because members of both predator and prey species possess a certain ‘competence’ and are capable of ‘using their natural abilities’ to survive on their own in the wild. 6.2).Īs I will argue next, Tom Regan’s rights-based approach to animal ethics offers a less gloomy picture of predation and provides a more solid way to escape the predation reductio than the consequentialist approach. Utilitarians can only avoid this reductio if they are prepared to reconsider their opinion of predation as an evil that must be eradicated (Sect. I will first argue that the utilitarian approach to the predation reductio is ultimately a dead end. This article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem. This conclusion, Clark asserts, “either does not follow, follows in the abstract but not in practice, or is not absurd” (Clark 1979, 187). (Ritchie 2002, 109–110)Ĭlark argues against this predation reductio he rejects Ritchie’s conclusion that, if non-human animals had rights, we should be obliged to defend them against predators. In our guardianship of the rights of animals, must we not protect the weak among them against the strong? Must we not put to death blackbirds and thrushes because they feed on worms, or (if capital punishment offends our humanitarianism) starve them slowly by permanent captivity and vegetarian diet? What becomes of the ‘return to nature’ if we must prevent the cat’s nocturnal wanderings, lest she should wickedly slay a mouse? Are we not to vindicate the rights of the persecuted prey of the stronger? Or is our declaration of the rights of every creeping thing to remain a mere hypocritical formula to gratify pug-loving sentimentalists.
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